

Improving the Effectiveness of Border Enforcement

Prepared statement by

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Before the

Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security

United States House of Representatives

1st Session, 113th Congress

Hearing on “A Study in Contrasts: House and Senate Approaches to Border Security”

I want to thank Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson-Lee, and the distinguished members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify today on this very important topic.

The testimony that follows is drawn largely from research I have been conducting over the past year with two distinguished economists, Bryan Roberts and John Whitley, for a recent Council on Foreign Relations paper entitled *Managing Illegal Immigration to the United States: How Effective is Enforcement?* Dr. Whitley is a senior fellow at the Institute for Defense Analyses, and the former director of the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), where he led the resource allocation process and the measurement, reporting, and improvement of performance. Dr. Roberts is senior economist at Econometrica, the current president of the National Economists Club, and formerly assistant director of Borders and Immigration in PA&E at DHS. I am the author of the 2008 book *The Closing of the American Border*, which examined U.S. efforts to strengthen border security in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and I was the project director for the 2009 Council on Foreign Relations

Independent Task Force on U.S. Immigration Policy, which was co-chaired by former White House chief of staff Mack McLarty and former Florida governor Jeb Bush.

I will make four points in my testimony.

First, U.S. border enforcement has become increasingly effective, and there is little question that entering the United States illegally across the land borders has become far more difficult and dangerous than ever before. The U.S. government is now two decades into an ambitious border build-up that clearly is producing results in terms of deterring illegal entry and apprehending a greater percentage of those who try.

Secondly, the current challenge is one of improving effectiveness rather than simply increasing resources. For many years the U.S. Border Patrol was badly under-resourced, but that is no longer the case. While additional resources may be needed, the focus should be on producing results rather than simply increasing inputs.

Third, the metrics for assessing progress in border enforcement are under-developed and need to be improved. The Department of Homeland Security made a significant strategic error over the past several years in failing to develop, share, and publicize better performance measures for border security. Congress has an opportunity to rectify that error and put the border control mission on a more solid foundation for the future.

Finally, the U.S. government has many tools for discouraging illegal immigration, and border enforcement needs to be seen as just one among many. Better workplace enforcement, more effective tracking of visa overstays, as well as larger and more flexible legal entry programs for lower skilled immigrants are all likely to show greater returns in reducing illegal inflows than are large additional investments in border enforcement.

Border security is always going to be a subjective question. There is no such thing as perfect security, and the question for policymakers is always going to be a difficult one of trading off costs and benefits. And in the border environment, there are many different security issues—illegal crossings by economic migrants, drug smuggling, gang violence, the sanctity of property, and the danger of infiltration by terrorists or serious criminals.

Our research has focused on the issue of illegal entry by migrants, and this remains the primary focus of the debate over border security. Many in Congress and among the public are concerned that a comprehensive immigration reform bill will be followed, as it was after the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), by another surge in illegal migration to the United States.¹ As a consequence, Congress is currently searching for ways to ensure continued progress on border security, as reflected in the approaches taken by the Senate in S. 744, the recently passed Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, and by this committee in H.R. 1417, the Border Security Results Act.

¹ Edward Alden, "Winning the Next Immigration Battle: Amnesty, Patrols, and the Future of U.S. Borders," *ForeignAffairs.com*, February 11, 2013.

Progress on Border Enforcement

Illegal entry to the United States has fallen sharply over the past decade, and the U.S. Border Patrol has become more effective in apprehending those who try to enter illegally. Our research used several methodologies for calculating apprehension rates for illegal crossers between the ports of entry and the number of successful illegal entries. Each of the methods shows a significant increase in the probability of apprehension over the past decade, and a significant decline in the number of illegal entries. A recent paper by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), based in part on data shared with CRS by the Department of Homeland Security, showed similar results.² The CRS said that “illegal inflows likely were lower in 2007-2012 than at any other point in the last three decades.”

The declining numbers of those attempting illegal entry has allowed the Border Patrol to deal more effectively with those it apprehends. Until quite recently, most Mexican nationals were voluntarily returned to Mexico, and Border Patrol records based on fingerprint identifications showed that many simply tried again to enter. At an apprehension rate of 50 or 60 percent, multiple entry attempts by a single individual would likely prove successful. An individual who faced a one in two chance of arrest, for instance, would have an 88 percent chance of succeeding if he or she made three attempts. The odds of successful entry on multiple attempts only go down sharply when apprehension rates are 70 percent or higher.

In an effort to deter such repeated attempts, the Border Patrol in recent years has greatly expanded its “Consequence Delivery System,” so that most of those apprehended in the vicinity of the border face a penalty more severe than simply voluntary return. These consequences include expedited removal (which imposes a five-year ban on any legal re-entry to the United States and criminal charges if the individual is caught again entering illegally); criminal charges and jail time, most notably through Operation Streamline; and remote repatriation, in which Mexicans arrested near the border are either flown back to their home towns in Mexico or are returned in distant border regions (i.e., someone arrested in Arizona is returned to Mexico across the border in Texas).

According to data released by DHS to the CRS, voluntary returns have fallen from 77 percent of all enforcement outcomes in FY 2005 (956,470 out of 1,238,554 apprehensions) to just 14 percent in FY2012 (76,664 out of 529,393).³ The consequence programs appear to have had a significant impact in reducing multiple entry attempts. In FY2012, more than 27 percent of those returned voluntarily were arrested a second time; in comparison, re-arrests for those who faced a consequence ranged from just 3.8 percent to 23.8 percent, suggesting that these individuals were deterred from subsequent illegal entry attempts.⁴

² Marc R. Rosenblum, “Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry,” Congressional Research Service, May 3, 2013.

³ Ibid. The number of “enforcement outcomes” exceeds the number of annual apprehensions because some aliens face more than one outcome, such as formal removal along with lateral repatriation. In addition, certain aliens apprehended in one fiscal year do not complete their case processing until the following years.

⁴ Of the different consequences, formal removal after a notice to appear in court was the most effective in reducing multiple attempts, with just a 3.8% recidivism rate in FY12. This may be a reflection of the fact that most of those so removed are from countries other than Mexico, and would face a long return trip to the border to make a subsequent attempt. Criminal charges

While the trends are unquestionably positive, it is difficult to assess the precise contribution of border enforcement to reducing illegal inflows. Researchers have long known that illegal immigration is far more responsive than legal immigration to the state of the economy and to employment opportunities.⁵ Legal migrants—who often wait many years for their green cards—are likely to come to the United States whenever the opportunity finally presents itself, regardless of economic conditions. Unauthorized migrants, however, tend to follow job opportunities.

The collapse of the U.S. housing market, the spike in unemployment during the 2008-09 recession and the slow recovery since would all have reduced illegal migration to the United States regardless of U.S. enforcement measures. In addition, somewhat better growth in the Mexican economy, which recovered more strongly from the recession than did the United States, has also increased employment opportunities in Mexico, which remains the largest source of illegal migration to the United States. The population of young men aged 15-24, the cohort that is most likely to migrate illegally, has also leveled off in Mexico and Central America as birthrates have fallen. Disentangling the effects of enforcement from these broader economic forces is challenging.

Recent research, however, indicates that the enforcement build-up has had an impact in deterring illegal migration. A 2012 study by a team of experts assembled by the National Research Council, for example, concluded that “studies of migration tend to find evidence of small but significant deterrent effects of border enforcement.”⁶ Empirical analysis of law enforcement specifically for unauthorized migrants is lacking, but empirical studies of law enforcement more broadly show significant deterrent effects on illegal behavior.⁷ To determine whether a potential migrant is deterred from illegal entry, data are needed both on potential migrants who decided to migrate and those who decided not to, and on the various factors potentially influencing their decision. Such analysis is challenging to carry out in terms of data availability and technical issues. The most recent research on deterrence has been conducted by Scott Borger, Gordon Hanson, and Bryan Roberts, who use data from the Mexican national household survey for 2002 to 2010.⁸ They identified individuals who migrated from Mexico and those who did not, developed measures of economic prospects in the United States and in Mexico, assessed U.S. border enforcement and the ease of migrating legally, and estimated the degree to which these factors affected whether an individual decided to migrate illegally in this period. Preliminary results suggest that the Great Recession, improvements in the Mexican economy, and border enforcement intensification were all significant influences on the downturn in illegal immigration since 2003, and that each of these factors may have accounted for roughly one-third of the

were also associated with recidivism rates of 10% or less. The least effective consequence was lateral repatriation to another sector of the border, which produced a 23.8% recidivism rate in 2012.

⁵ See Gordon H. Hanson, *The Economic Logic of Illegal Immigration*, Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 26, March 2007.

⁶ Alicia Carriquiry and Malay Majmundar, eds., *Options for Estimating Illegal Entries at the U.S.-Mexico Border*, National Academy of Sciences, 2012.

⁷ See Steven Levitt and Thomas Miles, “Empirical Study of Criminal Punishment,” in Mitchell A. Polinsky and Steven Shavell eds., *Handbook of Law and Economics*, Vol. 1, 2007.

⁸ See Scott Borger, Gordon Hanson, and Bryan Roberts, “The Decision to Emigrate from Mexico,” presentation at 2012 Society of Government Economists annual conference, Washington, DC, 2012.

decrease. These results suggest that enforcement in recent years has had a more significant effect than previous research had concluded.⁹

Are More Border Enforcement Resources Needed?

There is no question that the U.S. Border Patrol was underfunded for many decades, and that the lack of resources made it very difficult to take effective actions when illegal migration to the United States began rising sharply in the mid-1960s. Little was done to redress this problem until the mid-1990s, when growing complaints from border states such as California and Texas finally forced federal action. The response since then, however, has been dramatic. Border Patrol manpower more than doubled in the late 1990s and then again in the late 2000s to the current level of just over 21,000 agents. Fencing grew somewhat in the 1990s and then dramatically starting in 2006. Currently 651 miles of the 1,969-mile southwest border are fenced. The Border Patrol also makes use of many types of infrastructure and equipment, including sensors, night vision equipment, camera towers, patrol vehicles, river patrol boats, manned and unmanned aerial vehicles, and horses. After decades of underfunding, the Border Patrol now enjoys access to resources that better correspond to the demands of its missions. Appropriations for the Border Patrol have increased by roughly 750 percent since 1989, to a current level of \$3.7 billion.

S. 744, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, would authorize roughly another doubling of border enforcement resources over the next decade. The bill authorizes the expenditure of an additional \$46.3 billion over the next 10 years, with \$30 billion to be spent on adding an additional 19,200 Border Patrol agents, and the rest spent primarily on additional pedestrian fencing and border surveillance technology. The bill specifies those technology acquisitions on a sector-by-sector basis, though it permits the Secretary of Homeland Security to reallocate personnel, infrastructure and technology to achieve effective control of the southern border, and permits the acquisition of alternative technologies deemed equally effective.

This huge addition of resources is not one envisioned by current Border Patrol strategic plans. While the strategy developed in 2004 was a resource-based one that focused on achieving “operational control” of the border through increases in agents and technology, the most recent May 2012 strategy has switched from resource acquisition and deployment to strategic allocation of resources to allow for rapid responses to emerging threats. Additional surveillance assets are an important part of carrying out this strategy, but big increases in manpower are likely not necessary.¹⁰

⁹ The research has not yet been finalized due to the authors losing access to internal DHS apprehension record data in mid-2012. Researchers need data from individual apprehension records maintained by DHS in order to properly analyze illegal immigration into the United States. DHS has publicly disseminated all data needed by researchers from these records except the “fingerprint identification number,” which is the number assigned to records for the same individual as determined from examination of fingerprints. The fingerprint identification number is what permits recidivism analysis to be carried out. As this number is an arbitrary designation and cannot be used to identify an individual, reasons for not disseminating this information to the researcher community are unclear. For additional discussion on the need for DHS to provide more extensive access to administrative record data, see Carriquiry and Majmundar, *Options for Estimating Illegal Entries*.

¹⁰ See the description in Rosenblum, Marc R., “Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry”

Inputs are also a poor proxy for effectiveness. The primary outcomes for law enforcement activity are the rates at which laws under their jurisdiction are broken—the goal of law enforcement, in other words, is to reduce the crime rate. Additional resources are often needed to achieve that goal, but the addition of resources is not in itself a measure of accomplishment. The use of data to drive law enforcement strategy and execution has become standard in many local police departments. New York City pioneered the effort in 1994 with its crime statistics database, CompStat, which requires precinct commanders to report statistics for all crimes on a weekly basis, with the clear goal of bringing down crime rates.¹¹ The results are compared with crime statistics over previous periods, and that data is shared in real time with the public. The Department of Homeland Security and other agencies with responsibility for immigration enforcement, such as the Department of Justice and the State Department, need the same kind of data-driven revolution in which the focus shifts from inputs to results.

The focus on inputs rather than outcomes is not a problem unique to immigration enforcement. In K-12 education, for instance, the United States spends as much on education as most other advanced countries and more than many, but its relative performance has been slipping for decades.¹² In education, the measures of success for many years were input-based ones like the student-teacher ratio, rather than performance-based measures like the achievement levels of students. John Bridgeland and Peter Orszag, who held senior regulatory posts in the Bush and Obama administrations respectively, wrote recently that a rough calculation shows that “less than \$1 out of every \$100 of government spending is backed by even the most basic evidence that the money is being spent wisely.” Far too little research is conducted, they argue, to evaluate the effectiveness of government programs, and whether expenditures are actually achieving the desired goals. They conclude that “the first (and easiest) step is simply collecting more information on what works and what doesn’t.”¹³

The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), and its recent reissue as the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, seeks to make federal agencies more accountable for results, in part through reporting performance measures, which are quantified results related to inputs, outputs, and outcomes. Inputs are the resources that agencies expend in their operations and are the easiest to measure. Outputs are immediate results of agency programs and are also frequently relatively easy to measure and report. Outcomes are related to the ultimate goals of what agency programs are trying to achieve. Agencies are required by law to report performance measures to the public and do so in annual performance and accountability reports.

Performance Measures


In order to assess the effectiveness of border enforcement measures, the U.S. government needs to collect and share better data, with Congress, the public, and the external research community. While illegal immigration is complex and difficult to manage, the basic framework in which illegal immigration occurs can be simply illustrated in the diagram below.

¹¹ For a more detailed discussion, see John Whitley, “Five Methods for Measuring Unobserved Events: A Case Study of Federal Law Enforcement,” IBM Center for Business and Government, 2012.

¹² See Rebecca Strauss, *Remedial Education: Federal Education Policy Progress Report and Scorecard*, Council on Foreign Relations, June 2013.

¹³ John Bridgeland and Peter Orszag, “Can Government Play Moneyball?” *Atlantic*, July/August 2013.

FIGURE 1. ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION FRAMEWORK



Source: Authors' schematic based on DHS, CBP, ICE, and USCG data.

Visitors and immigrants are permitted to enter the United States legally at ports of entry, including airports, seaports, and land ports on the borders with Mexico and Canada. What the diagram shows is that unauthorized immigrants can enter in one of three ways: through the ports of entry, by presenting false documents or evading the screening process (i.e., in the trunk of a car); crossing illegally between the ports of entry; or by arriving on a legal visa and then overstaying that visa or otherwise violating its terms to remain in the United States illegally. Unauthorized immigrants can similarly depart in one of three ways: they can leave voluntarily; they can be arrested and removed; or they can adjust to legal status.¹⁴ If more unauthorized immigrants arrive than depart, then the stock of illegal immigrants grows.

In order to enforce the laws and manage illegal migration successfully, the United States government needs to know what is going on in each of these boxes. Ideally, the government should be measuring and reporting numbers for each. The following table, however—in which the items under “Outcome” correspond to each of the nine boxes in the diagram—show what was actually reported by DHS in its most recent Annual Performance Report.

¹⁴ Individuals could also die in the United States while in unauthorized status.

TABLE 1: PERFORMANCE REPORTING AT DHS

<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Performance Measures</i>	<i>FY11 Annual Performance Report^a</i>
Illegal entry between ports	number of attempted illegal entries	none
	number of apprehensions	partial
	apprehension rate	none
	number of successful entries	none
Illegal entry at ports	number of illegal entries	none
	number of apprehensions ^b	none
	apprehension rate	none
	number of successful illegal entries	none
Visa overstay	number of new visa overstayers	none
Illegal immigrants resident in the United States	number of illegal immigrants resident in the United States ^b	none
Voluntary departure	number of illegal immigrants leaving of their own accord	none
Law enforcement removal	number of illegal migrants removed	partial
Deaths and adjustments	number of illegal immigrants who died or became legal	none
Legal immigration	number of new H2A and H2B visas issued ^b	none

^aThis column indicates whether the performance measure was reported by DHS in its FY2011–2013 Annual Performance Report.

^bAlthough not reported in the DHS Annual Performance Report, some data on these measures are available from other sources

Source: Authors' calculations based on DHS's FY2011–2013 Annual Performance Report.

The failure of the department to provide the necessary performance measures has made it extremely difficult for Congress to assess progress towards key border security goals, and to set realistic performance benchmarks for the future. To take just two examples, in May 2011 DHS announced that it was developing a “Border Conditions Index” (BCI) that would assess the state of security in different regions of the border using measures such as illegal flows, wait times at ports of entry, and crime and public safety in the border region. But as this subcommittee was recently told by DHS, the department has still not finalized the index and has offered no timetable for its release. Similarly, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano has promised Congress since 2011 to produce and publish a country-by-country list of the number of visa overstays, based on US-VISIT entry records and airline passenger departure records. Visa overstays are

thought historically to account for as much as 40 percent of the unauthorized population in the United States. Research by demographer Robert Warren suggests that the number of new overstays has dropped sharply over the past decade.¹⁵ But DHS has yet to release any of its own data on this critical issue.

There are some encouraging signs of progress, however. CBP and the Border Patrol have shown a growing commitment to improving data collection and disseminating the results. The Government Accountability Office in December 2012 published a detailed report based on data collected by Border Patrol agents in the field from 2006 to 2011.¹⁶ These data include apprehensions, estimated “got-aways” (crossers known or suspected to have evaded apprehension and entered the United States), and estimated “turn-backs” (crossers who returned to Mexican territory before being apprehended). Estimates of got-aways and turn-backs are based on direct visual observation by agents in the field, visual observation through cameras, physical evidence of movement (collection of which is known as “sign cutting”), and information from local residents believed to be credible. Methods used to collect known-flow data are not standardized across Border Patrol sectors, and results for sectors cannot be compared, but the Border Patrol has been working to standardize collection methods.

The GAO report based on Border Patrol data shows significant progress on a sector-by-sector basis over the past five years. In the San Diego sector, for instance, the number of “got-aways” fell from 52,216 in 2006 to just 4,553 in 2011; in the Tucson sector in Arizona, got-aways fell from more than 207,000 in 2006 to just 25,376 in 2011. In the sectors that see the largest number of crossings, the “effectiveness rate” (the percentage of illegal crossers who are either apprehended or turned back) is quite high—91 percent in the San Diego sector, 87 percent in the Tucson sector, and 84 percent in the Laredo sector. The Rio Grande Valley sector in southern Texas, which has seen an influx of unauthorized migrants from Central America transiting through Mexico, had the lowest effectiveness rate at 71 percent. Border Patrol chief Michael Fisher testified to this subcommittee in February that his goal is to achieve 90 percent effectiveness in all high-traffic corridors along the southwest border.

The Border Patrol is also planning to use aerial and ground surveillance technologies to produce random, statistically valid samples of illegal entries along the border, including in remote, lightly-trafficked corridors where Border Patrol agents are less likely to observe unauthorized traffic. These samples should improve significantly the accuracy of estimates of successful illegal entries.

On visa overstays, DHS has made significant progress in matching overseas air arrivals to departures. Airlines are required to share all data on departing U.S. passengers, and DHS on a daily basis matches these departure records with arrival information recorded through the US-VISIT system. If records cannot be matched for an individual whose visa has expired, that individual is designated as an “unvetted potential overstay,” and US-VISIT assigns an adjudicator to check other databases to determine whether the person has departed. Until recently this has been challenging because of name match difficulties arising when an individual uses multiple passports, and because there was no automatic link to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) databases to determine if an individual had sought to adjust status and

¹⁵ Robert Warren and John Robert Warren, “A Review of the Declining Numbers of Visa Overstays in the U.S. from 2000 to 2009,” Center for Migration Studies, 2013.

¹⁶ Government Accountability Office, *Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs*, GAO-13-25, December 2012.

remain lawfully in the United States. DHS is now generating on a daily basis a list of potential overstays, and is vetting all those individuals. Confirmed overstays will face revocation of their visas or prohibitions on non-visa travel, and will be placed on enforcement lookout lists.

Tracking land border exits remains an enormous challenge, but the United States and Canada have been working as part of the Beyond the Border initiative to share information on land border departures, which would allow DHS to identify an individual who, for example, arrived by air in New York but departed over the land border to Canada. The initial phase of testing produced very positive results in terms of matching records.¹⁷

Congress needs to work with the Border Patrol and CBP to improve data collection and performance reporting, with the goal of continuing to improve enforcement outcomes. H.R. 1417 has a number of positive measures in this regard, including requirements that the Secretary of Homeland Security implement a comprehensive set of metrics for measuring the effectiveness of security at and between ports of entry, including effectiveness rates for illegal migration and drug seizures. The legislation also calls for external evaluation of metrics and progress by the Government Accountability Office, the Comptroller General and outside research organizations. The U.S. government should measure and report the full range of enforcement outcomes in a timely fashion, and share those measures as broadly as possible.

A Comprehensive Approach

Border enforcement cannot be looked at in isolation. The decision that an individual makes to migrate illegally is the result of many factors, including the likelihood of finding employment at a higher wage, greater security, reunification with family, and existence or lack of legal immigration or temporary work alternatives. Stronger border enforcement—which makes illegal crossings more dangerous and costly—is only one of many factors that may deter a migrant from attempting illegal entry.

Consider the following thought experiment. If the United States were to remove all quotas on legal immigration, the problem of illegal immigration would disappear overnight. By definition, anyone with the wherewithal to board a plane or take a bus and arrive in the United States would be a legal resident. There would be no need for any form of immigration enforcement. Consider the converse. If the United States were to eliminate all legal immigration, the problem of illegal immigration would become orders of magnitude larger. The government would need a far bigger immigration enforcement effort simply to keep down the number of unauthorized migrants. Neither of these extremes is plausible, of course, but they underscore the interconnected nature of any effort at reforming U.S. immigration laws. Larger legal programs, particularly for unskilled workers who have few legal alternatives for coming to the United States, would likely reduce illegal immigration. So too, more effective means to discourage employers from hiring unauthorized workers would reduce the incentive to migrate illegally. One of the many lessons from the failure of the 1986 IRCA was that the absence of effective worksite enforcement and a legal immigration path for most unskilled Mexicans and Central Americans were probably significant contributors to the surge in unauthorized migration in the 1990s. IRCA was in some ways the least optimal policy conceivable

¹⁷ Department of Homeland Security/Canada Border Services Agency, “Entry/Exit Information System Phase I Joint Canada-United States Report,” May 8, 2013.

for deterring illegal migration. It coupled weak enforcement at the workplace and at the border with strict quotas on unskilled workers that allowed few legal options for migration.

Thus any decision to increase border enforcement should ideally be weighed against other alternatives for reducing illegal immigration. Unfortunately, good cost-benefit measures are not currently available, which makes it difficult for policy-makers to make optimal choices. It is likely, for example, that the payoff from an additional dollar spent on workplace enforcement at this point in time would be larger than the payoff from an additional dollar spent on border enforcement. The Border Patrol is currently apprehending 50 percent or more of would-be illegal crossers, and the number of illegal entry attempts has fallen sharply; in some sectors, the average Border Patrol agent is making only a handful of arrests per year. In comparison, just seven percent of U.S. employers are currently enrolled in the E-Verify system to check the legal status of new hires, and only 385 employers were fined in FY2011 for hiring violations.¹⁸ The deterrence gains from better workplace enforcement are thus likely to be greater than the deterrence gains from still more border enforcement. In a major 2009 study, Stanford's Lawrence Wein and his colleagues suggested that additional workplace enforcement was likely to be about twice as effective as additional border enforcement in deterring future illegal migration.¹⁹

Larger legal immigration or temporary work programs, especially for lower-skilled workers who currently have fewer legal migration options, are also likely to dissuade illegal migration. In the 1950s, for example, the decision by the Eisenhower administration to double to 400,000 the quota for Mexican workers under the *bracero* temporary worker program appears to have had a significant impact in keeping illegal immigration low for more than a decade. Following the elimination of that program in 1965, illegal immigration immediately began to climb and remained at high levels until the second half of the 2000s.

Making better judgments about the effectiveness of different measures in reducing illegal migration is especially important when budgetary resources are scarce, which is likely to be the situation confronting DHS and other government agencies for many years. For the first decade of its existence, Congress threw so much money at DHS that it was rarely forced to weigh costs against benefits and make difficult decisions on resource deployment. That is no longer the case.

None of these is, of course, mutually exclusive. Congress may choose an "all of the above" strategy. But it is important to underscore that the impact of border enforcement on illegal migration cannot be considered in isolation, and that border enforcement is only one of many tools available to policymakers to reduce illegal immigration.

Thank you, and I would be happy to respond to your questions.

¹⁸ See Andorra Bruno, *Immigration-Related Worksite Enforcement: Performance Measures*, Congressional Research Service, May 10, 2012.

¹⁹ Lawrence M. Wein, Yifan Liu, and Arik Motskin, "Analyzing the Homeland Security of the U.S.-Mexico Border," *Risk Analysis*, vol. 29, no. 5, 2009, pp. 699–713.